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Abstract
How much wealth inequality arises from inheritance inequality? This is a fundamental,
but unresolved question.  Answering it empirically requires data that is unavailable and
potentially uncollectable.  An alternative approach initiated by Blinder (1974, 1976) and
Davies (1982), and the one taken here, is to simulate the transmission of inequality via
bequests.  This paper constructs, calibrates to U.S. data, and simulates a dynamic 88-
period overlapping generations model with the goal of determining how much bequests
and other factors affect the intragenerational distribution of wealth.  The model features
random death, random fertility, assortative mating, heterogeneous human capital
endowments, the inheritability of human capital, progressive income taxation, and the
partial annuitization through Social Security of households’ retirement savings.
All bequests in the model are undesired.  They arise because households are not fully
annuitized.  The absence of altruism or some other motivation for bequests does not
preclude our achieving a realistic wealth distribution.  Indeed, our model is fully capable
of generating a distribution of wealth that is just as unequal and just as skewed as the
actual U.S. wealth distribution (as measured with the 1995 Survey of Consumer
Finances).
The fact that intentional bequests are not a prerequisite for explaining wealth inequality is
just one of our striking findings.  We also find that inheritances play an important role in
increasing wealth inequality, but only in the presence of Social Security.  The reason is
that Social Security annuitizes all of the retirement savings of the poor and most of the
retirement savings of the middle class.  In so doing it eliminates inheritances by children
of the poor, dramatically reduces inheritances by children of the middle class, and leaves
essentially unchanged inheritances by children of the rich.  Absent Social Security,
inheritances actually reduce wealth inequality, albeit to a small degree.
Although inheritances in the presence of social security play an important role in
generating wealth inequality, the most important factors in this regard are human capital
differences, assortative mating based on these differences, and the annuitization of
retirement savings via social security.  Interestingly, the fact that agents inherit their skills
from their parents does not materially alter wealth inequality.  Equally interesting is the
affect of progressive income taxation on the wealth distribution.  In Social Security’s
presence, progressive income taxation exacerbates wealth inequality, but it reduces
wealth inequality in its absence.2
I.  Introduction
Does inequality in inherited wealth necessarily exacerbate wealth inequality? If
so, by how much? These are two fundamental questions that remain unresolved.
Although it may seem counterintuitive, inherited wealth may actually be more evenly
distributed than non inherited wealth and may reduce overall wealth inequality.  The
reason is that the distribution of inheritances is governed, in large part, by the random
nature of longevity.  In contrast, the distribution of non inherited wealth is largely
governed by the distribution of labor earnings.
Although theoretical research has clarified many of the channels through which
inheritances influence wealth inequality, the relative importance of these channels
remains unresolved.  Empirical analysis of inheritances has been limited by the
availability of reliable data.  An alternative approach initiated by Blinder (1974, 1976)
and Davies (1982), and the one taken here, is to simulate the transmission of inequality
via bequests.  Unlike previous simulation studies, however, our focus is on unintended
inheritances arising from random dates of death and the dynamic impact of these
inheritances on the distribution of wealth.
To study this process, we construct an overlapping generations model with
uncertain lifespan.  Each agent lives for at most 88 years – the first 22 years as a child, the
second 22 years as a young adult who marries and has children, the third 22 years as a
married, middle-aged adult who has no additional children, and the last 22 years as a
married or widowed older adult facing lifespan uncertainty.  Agents who die prior to
reaching age 88 bequeath their wealth to their spouses.  If their spouses are no longer
living, they bequeath in equal amounts to their children, all of whom are alive given the3
model’s timing.  Agents have life-cycle preferences, meaning they have no bequest
motive per se and leave bequests only because their resources are not fully annuitized.
Our model follows the economy and its existing and new agents through time.  This is a
prerequisite to determining the impact of random inheritances on the long-run distribution
of wealth.
The bequest/inheritance process is complicated.  Other things equal, children
whose parents die relatively early receive larger inheritances than children whose parents
die relatively late.  But how much one inherits depends both on the number of siblings
with whom one must share bequests and the amount of non annuitized wealth one’s
parents accumulate prior to their deaths.  Parents’ wealth accumulation depends, in turn,
on how much they themselves inherited (which depends on when their ancestors died),
the level of their earnings out of which they saved, and the number of children they had to
support.  Hence, earnings inequality, the transmission of earnings inequality across
generations, the number and spacing of children, assortative mating, the annuitization of
retirement savings through Social Security, and the progressivity of the income tax
system can all play important roles in influencing inequality in inheritances.  Our model
considers each of these factors and their interactions in trying to account, in a systematic
fashion, for wealth inequality.
Our results suggest that whether inheritances dampen or exacerbate wealth
inequality depends very strongly on social security’s annuitization of retirement savings.
Absent social security, inheritances reduce somewhat wealth inequality among members
of the same birth cohort.  In social security’s presence, however, inheritances are an
important force in increasing wealth inequality.  In our model, differences in lifetime4
earnings abilities (skills), assortative mating based on skills, and social security’s
annuitization of retirement savings are, however, the other major factors that contribute to
intragenerational wealth inequality.  Interestingly, holding constant inequality in skills,
the fact that agents inherit their skills from their parents does not materially alter wealth
inequality.  When all of the factors that influence wealth inequality are included, our
model is fully capable of generating distributions of wealth that closely approximate the
degree of inequality and skewness in the actual U.S. data as reported in the 1995 Survey
of Consumer Finances.
The paper proceeds in Section II with a brief literature review.  Section III
presents our simulation model and its calibration.  Section IV present results, and Section
V summaries and concludes the paper.
II.  Literature Review
Early studies of the link between inheritance and inequality focussed on the
relationship between the value of the estates of fathers and those of their sons
(Wedgwood, 1929, Harbury and Hitchens, 1979).  Wedgwood found, looking at a sample
of 99 people who left estates of at least £200,000 (just under $1,000,000) on death in
1924-5, 60 percent had a predecessor who died leaving at least £50,000, and that about
1/3 of the wealthy owed  their position entirely to inheritance.  Harbury and Hitchens
found that in 1973, 58 percent of those men who died leaving at least £100,000 had
fathers who had left at least £25,000 at 1973 prices and that 67 percent of the variance in
a son’s estate was explained by the variation in the father’s estate.5
Interesting as they are, these data do not demonstrate firmly that inherited wealth
is a source of inequality.  The data relate to the total value of the father’s estate and not to
the amount inherited by the son, which may have been much less if the estate was divided
equally among a number of children.  And they are perfectly consistent with the view that
a wealthy father endowed his children with advantages in life that helped them become
wealthy.  Nevertheless they reinforced the widely-held view summarized by Meade
(1976) that inheritance is a source of inequality in the distribution of wealth, a conclusion
supported by the theoretical model of Wilhelm (1997).  This view underlies support for
estate taxation as a potential mechanism for redistributing wealth.
The idea that intergenerational transfers can be equalizing can be traced to Stiglitz
(1969).  In common with most of the growth literature of the day, he assumed that each
individual’s consumption was a linear function of her total income (labor earnings plus
capital income).  He demonstrated that a stable, egalitarian distribution of wealth would
emerge if inheritances were distributed evenly among all of one’s children.
Much subsequent work has focussed on the impact of inheritance on income
inequality rather than wealth inequality. Stiglitz and Atkinson (1980) used the same
model, but added earnings heterogeneity, to show that an increase in the size of
inheritances, caused by an increase in the rate of savings, would decrease income
inequality.  In essence, inheritances act as insurance against the random receipt of lower
than average labor income.  If an agent’s earnings end up below (above) the average for
his cohort, chances are his parents’ earnings were higher (lower), and their bequest will
permit his parents to share with him their better (worse) luck.  Stiglitz and Atkinson also
pointed out that for inheritances to increase inequality in these linear models an additional6
mechanism needed to operate to offset this insurance effect.  Stiglitz (1969) suggested
primogeniture (the oldest son receives the entire estate).  Blinder (1973) suggested class
mating.
The model of Becker and Tomes (1979) and Tomes (1981) highlights the joint
role that inheritances of financial wealth and earning power (human capital) play in
determining whether intergenerational transfers are equalizing.  Their condition for this
outcome is that the propensity of parents to transfer financial and tangible resources to
their children exceeds the inheritability of human capital -- the correlation coefficient
between the parent’s and the child’s human capital.  Deardon, Machin and Reed (1997)
and Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992) have recently tried to estimate the inheritability
of human capital in the United Kingdom and the United States, respectively.  Their
results suggest a coefficient of 0.5 for the correlation between a father’s and a son’s
earnings.  Although this is a large correlation, it’s not clear whether it arises because of
genetics or parents’ human capital investment in their children.
Laitner (1979a and 1979b) constructs a utility-maximizing framework in which
parents care about both their own and their children’s consumption, bequests must be
non-negative, and there is no inheritability of human capital.  He shows that an
equilibrium wealth distribution exists and that inheritances are equalizing if there is no
assortative mating.
Theoretical work on taxation also provides grounds for doubting that inheritances
are unequalizing.  Becker and Tomes (1979) and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) show that
inheritance taxation can increase income inequality.  However if there are incomplete
markets, such as the market for educational loans considered by Loury (1981), it is7
possible that the redistributive taxation of bequests can reduce intragenerational
inequality.
The question of whether inheritances increase or decrease income inequality has
also been studied empirically.  Tomes (1981) examined this question directly and found
evidence in support of an equalizing effect.  Davies and Kuhn (1991) suggest that even
though inheritances are equalizing in the long run, a rise in inheritance taxation will
reduce inequality in the short run, but raise it in the long run.
Blinder (1974, 1976) conducts simulation studies with both intragenerational
heterogeniety, and life-cycle accumulation to  conclude that inheritances are unimportant
in determining inequality of annual income, and that there was high intergenerational
mobility in the distribution of inherited wealth.  However, the impact of inheritances on
current wealth is not studied.
In a very important paper, Davies (1982) conducts simulations based on a
behavioral model of life cycle saving and bequests: Parents maximize lifetime utility over
their own and their adult childrens’ consumption subject to their own and their childrens’
lifetime budget constraints.  Optimal consumption is simulated over a fixed lifespan for
500 couples.  Each parent couple is identical on all except the following dimensions:
Parents’ own inheritances, earnings, rate of return, rate of time preference, intensity of
altruism toward children, and parents’ age of first birth.  Random draws of these variables
from distributions calibrated to Canadian data are used for each couple before computing
its optimal consumption path and desired bequest.  Bequests occur when parents die,
which, given there is no lifespan uncertainty occurs at a common age.  Bequests are
distributed among children equally or, alternatively, in a compensatory manner based on8
children’s earnings. Assuming constant rates of income and population growth over time,
a single simulation over 500 couples suffices to generate a cross-section distribution of
wealth, income, and lifetime resources.   The cross-section distributions of wealth and
income generated in this manner match the 1970 Canadian distributions quite closely.
The Davies paper also attempts to explore the impact of the different sources of
heterogeneity on inequality.  Unfortunately, the multi-generation (dynamic) simulations
required to explore the long-run level of bequests and inequality from resulting from
removing, in turn, the heterogeneity in each of the variables was precluded by limits on
computational capacity.  Consequently, Davies was forced to consider these experiments
assuming no bequests.
As indicated, Davies explored only the role of intentional bequests on inequality
and in a static content; i.e., he did not consider how the receipt of inheritances by one
generation would influence the receipt of inheritances by the next generation and so on.
In contrast, the bequests in our model are purely unintentional.  They are also random,
and this randomness requires tracing their influence over successive generations; i.e., it
necessitates a dynamic approach.
Other researchers have examined the motives underlying bequests.  Laitner and
Juster (1996) find some limited support for altruism.  In contrast, Boskin and Kotlikoff
(1985), Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoff (1992, 1997), Abel and Kotlikoff (1994), Hayashi,
Altonji, and Kotlikoff (1996), Gokhale, Kotlikoff, and Sabelhaus (1996), and Wilhelm
(1996) all find strong evidence against intergenerational altruism, suggesting that most
bequests may be unintended or motivated by non altruisitic considerations.9
Hurd (1992) examines the influence of children on saving by elderly people in the
United States.  He finds that old people with children do save more than those without
children, but that the effect is statistically insignificant.  Thus his findings are consistent
with our model and with the underlying view that bequests are accidental.  He presents
simulations that show the impact of a strong bequest motive increasing his estimated
value by one standard deviation, a factor of over 6. This change raises total bequests by
just 17 per cent, suggesting that, the bequest motive he identifies is not only statistically
insignificant but it is also small in absolute terms. His findings make it seem unlikely that
a powerful bequest motive is needed to explain the pattern of inherited wealth. This may,
of course be because, in a situation in which incomes are rising and children earn more
than their parents, parents would generally feel little need to leave bequests to their
children (Meade 1966) and would prefer a transfer in the other direction.
It is frequently observed that retired consumers save rather than dissave. Prima
facie this might indicate a bequest motive in some form (Hurd, 1990).  However Gokhale,
Kotlikoff, and Sabelhaus (1996) and Miles (1997) point out that when wealth is
calculated correctly to include the capitalized value of social security receipts, then it does
indeed tend to fall throughout retirement.  Hurd also comes to the conclusion that,
looking carefully at panel and cross-section data, the evidence on wealth change is
consistent with the life-cycle hypothesis and the view that bequests are accidental
Hugget (1996) develops a large-scale life-cycle simulation model with uncertain
labor income that follows an autoregressive process and uncertain lifetimes.  He
compares the model’s age-wealth distribution to the actual U.S. distribution and finds a
fairly close match except at the very upper tail.  But unlike our analysis, which is focused10
on the impact that the distribution of inheritances has on wealth inequality, Hugget
ignores this issue by assuming that all bequests are collected by the government and
divided evenly across the population.
III.  The Model
This section describes the model’s demographic structure, its marital
arrangements, its fertility patterns, its method of constructing an initial distribution of the
population, its method of populating the model through time, its allocation of skills to the
model’s agents, its determination of bequests and inheritance, its time-zero wealth
distribution, the length of its simulations, and its consumption and saving behavior.
Demographic Structure
As mentioned in the introduction, agents in the model can live for 88 periods. All
economic and demographic events (like earnings, consumption, marriages, births, deaths,
wealth transfers and so on) occur at the end of each period.  Agents are children during
the first 22 periods of life and consume as part of their parent’s households at ages 1
through 22. (We assume that consumption occurs before births so that newborns don’t
consume.) Agents marry on their 22
nd birthday.  They give birth to children at ages 22
through 43, depending on their draw from a "birth matrix" (as explained below).  They
also enter the work force on their 22
nd birthday (to receive their first paycheck at age 23),
and work through age 66.  They never die at or prior to age 66, but face probabilities of
dying each year between ages 67 and 88.  The probability of dying on their 88
th birthday
given that a person reached age 87 is set at unity.  The probabilities of dying at ages 67
through 87 are taken from United States' mortality statistics.11
The number, sexes, and timing of children born to each couple are determined
randomly (as discussed below).  This distribution is aligned to ensure that an equal
number of males and females are born each year.  There is no population growth, so total
annual births remain fixed through time.  There are two thousand males and two thousand
females in each cohort.
Marriage
Agents are assigned their marriage partners at age 22, each on a random basis or on the
basis of their earnings.  In the later case of assortative mating, agents are married based
on their skill rank, with the top skilled female marrying the top skilled male, the next
most skilled female marrying the next most skilled male, and so on.
Fertility
An initial population (at time t=0) of 4000 thousand individuals (2000 males and
2000 females) is created for each age between 0 and 87.  This is done as follows: First, a
matrix of "birth ages" is derived from a fertility simulation of CORSIM – a dynamic
microsimulation model of the U.S. economy described in Caldwell et al. (1998).  This
matrix considers only female ages of giving birth ranging between 22 and 43.  For each
female, the CORSIM birth matrix records a maximum of 10 birth ages, 5 for male and 5
for female births.  Thus, the matrix has 40,434 rows and 10 columns. Table 1.1 shows the
distribution of females in the CORSIM matrix by number and sex of births.
Since, computer memory limitations allow us to process only 4000 individuals in
each year of birth, we need to pare down our birth matrix in such a way as to end up with12
a modified birth matrix that contains exactly 2000 male births and 2000 female births.
We start by selecting 2000 rows from the birth matrix.  The selection is done at random
without replacement except that rows containing more than 5 births are excluded.  The
total number of births in the selected 2000-row matrix exceeds 4000.  Hence, we
randomly eliminate male and female births in the rows of this matrix for rows containing
more than one birth to guarantee that the 2000 rows of the final birth matrix generate
exactly 2000 female and 2000 male births.  Table 1.2 shows the distribution of females by
number and sex of births in the birth matrix used in the simulation.
Populating the Model at Time Zero
We start populating our model by creating 2000 male and 2000 female old-adults
for each age between 67 and 88.  These males and females are married to each other
sequentially.  Some of these oldsters will be treated as dead when we initiate the
simulation.  But we need to include their ghosts at this stage of our process of populating
the model in order to establish complete family trees.  Marriage is allowed only between
people of the same age to be consistent with our assumption that marriage occurs at age
22 (i.e., that initial oldster males married initial oldster females when they were 22 and
their wife was 22).  Family relationships are established by exchanging id numbers.  For
example, marriage involves entering the spouse’s id numbers in the spouse-id location of
each person’s record.  Oldsters have no living parents or grandparents.
Drawing from the 2000 thousand rows of the birth matrix at random and without
replacement, the middle-aged and young-adult children of the initial oldsters are created,
ranging in age from 24 through 66.  Take, for example, the initial 70-year olds.  For each13
70 year-old female (including the ghosts), we assigned a row of the birth matrix drawn at
random without replacement.  This row indicates how many children the female had and
the ages at which she had them.  We repeat this process of drawing at random without
replacement from the birth matrix for each cohort of oldster females; i.e., we do it for 66
year-old oldster females, 67 year-old oldster females, and so on through 87 year-old
oldster females.  In this process, we are not permitting oldsters to bear children in their
twilight years, rather we are retrospectively considering the births of the initial oldsters
when they were in their child-bearing years.  When each child is created, the parents’ id
numbers and years of birth are entered in the child's record, and the child's id number and
year of birth is entered in each of the parent’s record.
Given that females give birth between the ages of 22 and 43, oldsters aged 88 at
the initiation of our simulation (t=0) have children who are aged 45 through 66; oldsters
aged 87 at t=0 have children aged 44 through age 65; and so on, until we reach oldsters
aged 67 at t=0 who would have children aged between 24 and 45.  Thus, at this stage of
our populating procedure, exactly 4000 (the full compliment of) 45 year-olds and less
than 4000 thousand individuals at other ages between 24 and 66 have been created.  The
reason is that everyone (including oldster ghosts) who could have given birth to 45 year-
olds have been considered, but not everyone who gave birth to those between ages 24 and
44 and those between ages 46 and 66 have been considered.  For example, some of those
aged 25 are children of the current middle aged rather than of the current oldsters
(including the ghosts), and some of those aged 50 are children of ghosts who are older
than the current oldsters.14
Since at this stage there are fewer than 4000 middle-aged males and females at
ages 46-66, additional middle-aged males and females are created such that they total
4000 for each of these age groups.  Next, all middle-aged males and females (those aged
45 through 66) are married at random, making sure that siblings are not married to each
other.  Next, the children of middle-aged adults are created, again taking draws without
replacement from the birth matrix for females of a given age and then doing the same for
females of another age until all females age 45 through 66 have been considered.  The
children produced by this process range in age from 2 through 44.
1  Given that we’ve
already created the children of the t=0 oldsters, the addition of these children leave us
with exactly 2000 males and 2000 females aged 23 through 44—the young adults.  The
procedure just described is also used to marry the young adults.
The next step in the creation of the initial population is to create the children of
the t=0 young adults that were born at t=–1 or earlier.  Each young-adult female is
assigned a row of the birth matrix at random without replacement, and children are
created for all birth ages less than the age at t=0 of the female in question.  For example, a
44 year-old female’s children are created for birth ages between 22 and 43, but a 23 year-
old’s children are created only if her birth-row assignment contains a birth-age of 22.
That is, children that will be born at t=0 or later are not created as yet.  At the end of this
process, exactly 2000 males and 2000 females have been created for each age between 1
                                                          
1 Sixty-six-year-olds have children aged between 23 and 44; 65 year-olds have children aged between 22
and 43; and so on through 45 year-olds who have children aged between 2 and 23.15
and 88.  The final step in creating the initial population is to kill off oldsters (make the
ghosts disappear) according to their cumulative mortality probabilities.
2
Each person-record contains id numbers and years of birth of the spouse, parents,
grandparents, and children.  Also recorded is the position of the birth-matrix row selected
for each adult household, whether the person is alive or dead and, if dead, the year of
death.
Populating the Model through Time
In populating the model through time we engage in the following steps in each
year from t=0 onward.  First, for t=0, we allocate at random and without replacement a
row from the birth matrix to all 22 year-old females.  Second, 22-year-olds males and
females are married to each other (at random, or according to their skill ranks depending
on the case being considered).  Third, females age 22-43 will give birth as determined by
their assigned birth matrix row thereby creating 2000 newborn (0-year-old) males and
2000 newborn (0 year-old) females.  Fourth, oldsters are killed off at random according to
the conditional probability of dying at their respective ages and the existing wealth of
those who just died is transferred to the surviving spouse or children.  Fourth, we age
everyone, excluding those who died, by one year.
                                                          
2 The mortality probabilities are based on U.S. mortality tables.  Conditional mortality probabilities below
age 67 are set to zero and the conditional mortality probability at age 88 is set to unity. The probability of
dying at age=a, da, is calculated as
                        a-1
da=(1-sa) P ss,
               s=67
where ss is the conditional probability of surviving at age s.16
Skill Endowments
In our simulations with no skill differences, all working agents are assigned a skill
level of 1 and receive an annual wage of 1 because we normalize at unity the wage per
unit of skill.  In the case of skill differences but no assortative mating, we assign agents
skill levels randomly when they reach age 23 (the time of receiving the first paycheck),
which they keep throughout their working lives.
Specifically, we used the March 1998 Current Population Survey (including the
population weights) to determine, separately for males and females, average earnings
within each percentile of the earnings distribution, where earnings is defined as the sum
of wages plus salaries plus self-employment income (when positive); i.e., we calculate
average earnings of the poorest 1 percent of males, the next poorest 1 percent of males,
etc., and the same for females.
Next, we construct earnings arrays for males and females with 2000 entries each.
The first 20 entries for the males are assigned the average earnings in the lowest
percentile of the male earnings distribution, the next 20 entries are assigned the average
earnings in the second-from-lowest percentile of the male earnings distribution, and so on
until all 2000 entries are assigned a value.  The same procedure is followed in
constructing the female earnings array.  Each of the 2000 males (females) in a birth
cohort is then assigned one of the 2000 male (female) entry values on a random basis.
This assignment is done without replacement in order to ensure that each cohort that
comes along has precisely the same distribution of labor earnings.
Given this assignment of wages, we compute the average value of wages over all
males and females in the cohort and then divide each agent’s wage by this average.  The17
resulting value represents the agent’s skill level, which he or she has throughout his or her
working life.  This normalization ensures that each cohort’s skill level has an average
value of 1.  Figure 1 shows the normalized skill profiles by skill rank.  The increase in
skill level at each rank is very gradual for the first 95 ranks but skill levels increase quite
sharply at the highest skill ranks.
In the case of assortative mating, we repeat the above assignment of skills, but
then marry the highest skilled female with the highest skilled male, the second highest
skilled female to the second highest skilled male, and so on.  In the case of inherited
skills, we assign to each male agent the skill level of his father and to each female agent
the skill level of her mother.  In the case of inherited skills and assortative mating, males
and females inherit their father’s and mother’s skills, respectively, and assortative mating
proceeds based on this skill distribution.
Bequests and Inheritances
When a married oldster dies, his or her spouse retains all the marital wealth; i.e.,
all bequests by married agents go to their spouses.  When a widowed oldster dies or if
both spouses in a married couple die at the same time, the decedent(s’) wealth is evenly
divided among the children.
Initial Wealth Endowments and Length of the Simulations
To initiate a simulation, we give all adults at t=0 an endowment of wealth of 1
unit.  We then run the model for enough years into the future until the distribution of
wealth of 67 year-olds as well as the total amount of wealth in the economy stabilizes.18
Since the asymptotic wealth distribution as well as the total level of wealth are
independent of the initial level and distribution of wealth, the fact that we start with this
particular initial endowment of wealth doesn’t alter our results.  In practice, both the
wealth distribution of 67 year-olds and the total level of wealth converge well before 150
years in each of our simulations.  But to guarantee consistency across simulations, we ran
each simulation out for 150 years.
Consumption and Saving Behavior
Agents’ expected utility are time-separable isoelastic functions of their own
current and future consumption as well as that of their children through age 22.  Consider,
as an example, the expected utility of a couple that is age 23 and that will have two
children, one when the couple is age 25 and the other when it is 28:
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In (1), the first summation considers the utility of each spouse from his or her own
consumption at each possible age to which they could live.  The second two summations
consider the utility that the couple derives from the consumption of their two children.
The terms cha , cwa , ck1a , and ck2a refer, respectively, to the consumption of the husband,
wife, first child, and second child when the couple is age a.  The term b is the time-
preference factor, s is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and d is a child-
consumption weighting factor.  In our simulations, we set the time preference rate (which
equals (1/b)-1) equal to the interest rate.  We also set d equal to .4, and assume that s is
very close to zero.19
As s approaches zero, households become more and more reluctant (they become
more and more concerned about) consuming smaller amounts in the future than they
consume in the present.  Since the inverse of s is the household’s coefficient of relative
risk aversion, a value of s close to zero translates into a coefficient of risk aversion close
to infinity.
In our simulations, we assume that s is very close to zero.  Hall (1988) reports
that there is “... no strong evidence that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is
positive.  Earlier findings of substantial positive elasticities are reversed when appropriate
estimation methods are used.”
The assumption that s is very close to zero simplifies enormously household
consumption decisions.  First this assumption in conjunction with the assumption of a
time preference rate equal to the interest rate means that households seek to maintain the
same level of consumption over time for each spouse.   Households also seek to maintain
a constant level of consumption for their children, when they are children.  Given the
value of d, this child consumption level equals 40 percent of the parental consumption
level.
But most important, our assumption that s is very close to zero means that
households only consider their safe resources in deciding how much to consume at each
point in time.  Thus households who expect to receive an inheritance, but don’t know for
sure that they’ll get one (because all of their parents may live through age 87), will ignore
this potential source of future income in making their current consumption and saving
decisions.20
At each point in time, married households will calculate the number of years of
remaining life, multiply this amount by 2 (to take into account the presence of both
spouses) and then add to the resulting value .4 times the number of years of consumption
of their children.  This total number of effective adult consumption-years is then divided
into the household’s safe resources to determine consumption per effective adult.  The
household’s safe resources consist of its wealth (which may reflect the receipt of past
inheritances) plus the present value of its remaining lifetime labor earnings.  Given the
level of consumption per effective adult, it’s straightforward to calculate total household
consumption and subtract it from total household income to determine household saving.
We want to emphasize that inheritances affect consumption behavior, but only
once they are received.  There is no consumption out of potential future inheritances.
Instead households, at each point in time, consider the worst-case scenario and formulate
their consumption and saving plans accordingly. Were we to assume a positive value of  
s, households would take a gamble and consume more in the presence in anticipation of
possibly inheriting in the future.  But their decision as to how much to consume would be
extraordinarily complex.  The reason is that they would, at certain ages, have to take into
account not simply their own resources, including their own wealth, but also that of their
parents and their grandparents, assuming their grandparents are still alive. Take, for
example, a 25 year-old couple with two sets of living parents and four sets of living
grandparents.  In deciding how much to consume the household has to consider its own
current wealth level as well as the wealth levels of all six parental and grandparental
households.  Formally, the dynamic program that the household must solve to determine
how much to consume involves up to seven state variables, namely all seven of these21
wealth levels.
3  Unfortunately, solving dynamic programs with seven state variables
appears to be beyond the capacity of current computers.
4
Data and Calibration
The mortality probabilities used in the analysis are those released by the U.S.
Social Security Administration for 1995.  The interest rate (equal to the time preference
rate) used in the simulations is 4 percent.  As mentioned, the skill distribution is derived
from the March 1997 Current Population Survey.  The CORSIM fertility module is highly
detailed.  It includes separate logistic functions for fertility estimated for 30 different
subgroups of women using data from the National Longitudinal Survey.  The subgroups
are distinguished by age, the presence of children, marital status, race, and work status.
The regressors in the logits are age, duration of current marriage, earnings, family
income, homeowner status, marital status, schooling status, work status, and duration
since the birth of women’s two youngest children.   In producing the larger birth matrix
from which we selected 2000 rows, we ran the CORSIM model from its start year of
1960 through 2000.  In so doing, we used the entire panoply of CORSIM modules to
assign CORSIM agents the various socio-economic characteristics, such as work status,
entering as regressors in the fertility logits.
                                                          
3 We say “up to” because during years in which the household is age 66 and over, it has neither living
parents nor living grandparents, and during years in which the household is age 44 through 65, it has no
living grandparents.
4 The fact that even supercomputers would have difficulty solving this problem in a reasonable amount of
time raises the question of how mere mortals can actually deal with this complexity.22
IV. Findings
Wealth Inequality in the SCF
For reference, we first report findings from the 1995 Survey of Consumer
Finances on the distribution of net worth among married households with household
heads aged between 60 and 69.  The net worth calculation is based on computer code
provided in the SCF documentation.  Net worth percentiles are calculated using the final
non-response adjusted sample weights provided in the SCF.  The percent of wealth held
by the top x percent of households for selected values of x is reported in Table 2.  The
richest 1, 5, and 10 percent of households hold 30.4, 51.0, and 62.5 percent, respectively,
of aggregate U.S. net worth.  The associated Gini coefficient for this wealth distribution is
0.727.  These calculations indicate two things: first, the U.S. wealth distribution is highly
unequal among married households whose household heads are of retirement age and
second, the very rich account for a very sizeable fraction of total wealth.
Wealth Inequality Generated by Our Model
Table 3 begins to consider wealth inequality generated by our model.  It reports
Gini coefficients of wealth and consumption distributions for households aged 66.  It also
shows the flow of bequests as a share of labor income, and the flow of bequests left to
children (as opposed to spouses) as a share of the economy’s labor income.  Table 4
shows the percent of wealth owned by the richest households in the same manner as in
Table 2.  In both tables, the odd numbered rows report results without inheritances and
the even numbered rows those with inheritances.23
The first point to make about Table 3 is that the flow of bequests is a significant
fraction – roughly 8 to 9 percent -- of labor income for each of the simulations involving
uncertain lifetimes.   The flow of bequests to children, as opposed to spouses, is also
significant – roughly 3 percent of labor income.  Second, the flow of consumption is
higher with inheritances than without.  This is as expected since inheritances constitute an
intergenerational redistribution from the old to the young.  This raises the lifetime
resources of each successive new generation, permitting it to consume at higher levels.
The first column of Table 3 indicates that the inclusion of uncertain lifetimes in
the simulation has only a modest effect on wealth inequality.  Leaving out skill
differences and mortality, the Gini is just 0.045.  This Gini is non-zero because of
differences across households in the number and timing of their children.  These
differences influence the amounts that households consume when young and, thus, the
amounts of wealth they bring into old age.  Although the addition of uncertain lifetimes
raises the Gini coefficient by almost one third, to 0.075, this is still a very small value and
suggests that, by themselves, inheritances arising from random death date are not a major
source of wealth inequality across members of the same cohort.
Table 3 also indicates that skill differences are a major force behind wealth
inequality in our model.  With inheritances, the introduction of skill differences increases
the wealth Gini from 0.075 to 0.355 (compare rows 2 and 4). Under our assumptions and
parameterization, fertility differences, inheritances, and skill differences together explain
almost 50 percent of the intragenerational inequality observed in the SCF data, with skill
differences being the predominant factor among the three.24
The inclusion of marital sorting by skill increases the wealth Gini coefficient
further to 0.436 (Table 3, row 6).  This effect is significant, but not huge. The reason is
that the rate of increase in skill levels for each skill-rank increment is not very steep for
the first 95 ranks (see Figure 1).  Hence, marital sorting by skill class does not imply
pairing individuals with very different skill levels relative to marrying them at random.
This effect accounts for a further 11 percent of the Gini observed in the SCF data. Further
adding inheritance of skills only marginally increases the Gini coefficient on wealth to
0.443 (Table 3, row 10).  Thus, inheritance of skills contributes only a very small amount
(if at all) to intragenerational wealth inequality at retirement.
Although uncertainty in dates of death raises wealth inequality slightly in the
absence of skill differences, it does the opposite in the more realistic case that skill
differences exist.  As rows 3 through 10 in Table 3 indicate, this is true whether or not
couples sort themselves in the marriage market based on skills or whether skills are
inherited.  Under each of these assumptions, the Gini coefficient is somewhat smaller
with uncertain lifetimes than without; that is, inheritances reduce, rather than raise,
wealth inequality.  This result is not surprising.  Because only a few households in each
birth cohort have very high skills, very large bequests are likely to go to children with
skill levels lower than their parents’ skill level.  This has a slight equalizing effect on the
distribution of wealth at retirement.
Note that the Gini values for consumption at retirement are the same as those for
wealth.  This is because for a given number of children, lifetime resources, consumption,
and wealth at retirement are all strictly proportional in all of the simulations reported in
Table 3.25
Table 4 shows wealth held by households in the top x percentiles for selected
values of x.  Consistent with the results of Table 3, wealth held by richer households is
significantly larger when skill differences are present.  In the presence of inheritances, for
example, the share of wealth held by the richest 5 percent of households increases by
more than a factor of three (compare rows 2 and 4 in Table 4).  The fractions of wealth
held by the richest 1, 5, and 10 percent of households are all higher when marital sorting
by skill is included.  They are not significantly different when children inherit skills from
their parents compared to the case that skills are assigned at random to members of each
cohort.
The wealth distributions for the simulation results reported thus far exhibit much
less inequality than found in the SCF.  In each of the rows in Table 4, the shares of wealth
held by the richest 1, 5, and 10 percent of households are much smaller compared to those
reported in Table 2.
Adding Progressive Income Taxation
Tables 5 and 6 add progressive income taxation to each of the cases of Tables 3
and 4.
5  Because a part of income is taxed away, total consumption, total bequests and
intergenerational bequests are all smaller as shares of aggregate labor income.  All of the
Gini coefficients on wealth are marginally smaller compared to those shown in Table 3.
The pattern of these Gini coefficients is similar to those in Table 3: Differences in skills
                                                          
5 In incorporating progressive income taxation, we iterate over guesses of consumption per person until the
household’s remaining lifetime budget constraint, including income tax payments along the way, is
satisfied. This is done in each period and for each household.  If the household is subject to the borrowing
constraint at retirement, we first solve the households consumption problem through retirement to deliver
zero wealth at retirement.  Finally, post retirement consumption is calculated using the same procedure26
contribute the most to wealth inequality at retirement.  Marital sorting by skill class
induces greater wealth inequality, but the inheritance of skills does not.
As a comparison of Tables 3 and 5 reveals, the Gini coefficients for consumption
are somewhat smaller than those for wealth at retirement in the presence of progressive
income taxation.  This is as expected because under progressive income taxation, a larger
wealth level at any age cannot be converted into a proportionally larger stream of
consumption; the asset income generated along the way is taxed at a higher marginal (and
average) rate, the higher the level of wealth.
A comparison of Tables 4 and 6 shows that richer households own somewhat
smaller fractions of total wealth in the presence of progressive income taxation.  For
example, when all factors are present (rows 10 in Table 4 and 6), the introduction of
progressive taxation reduces the wealth held by the top 10 percent of households from
36.6 percent to 33.2 percent.  These results suggest that progressive income taxation
reduces inequality is rather ineffective in reducing wealth inequality at retirement.
Introducing Social Security
Tables 7 and 8 show the effect of introducing annuities via a social security
system.  Specifically, 15.3 percent of each year’s labor income (the OASDHI Social
Security and Medicare payroll tax rate) up to a maximum taxable limit calibrated to
correspond to the U.S. Social Security System’s taxable limit is accumulated at a 4
percent interest rate and converted into an actuarially unfair annuity at retirement (age
67).  The payment of the annuity is made contingent on the individual being alive.
                                                                                                                                                                            
subjecting Social Security benefits to income taxation.27
Adding annuitization to the model raises the possibility that those households for whom
lifetime consumption per capita is less than their annuity per capita during retirement will
choose to arrive at retirement with a negative net worth.  To prevent households from
leaving negative bequests, we subject such households to a borrowing constraint at
retirement.  That is, net borrowing is permitted prior to retirement but the liability must
be extinguished to leave the household with exactly zero net worth at retirement.
The annuities are calibrated to be unfair because payroll taxes are not reimbursed
in retirement in the form of fair annuities in the United States.  Caldwell et al. (1999)
estimate that on average, 74 cents of every dollar of the payroll tax represents a pure tax.
That is, the present value of Social Security benefits at retirement equals the accumulated
value of only 26 percent of payroll taxes paid during the working lifetime. It is,
nevertheless, difficult to approximate the correct degree of unfairness because similar
“money’s worth” calculations are not available for Medicare.  The simulations reported in
Tables 7 and 8 assume that, for each person, only 30 percent of payroll taxes are
converted into an annuity, with the rest representing a pure tax.
All of the cases in Table 7 show a significant increase in wealth inequality relative
to the corresponding cases of Table 3.  For example, with inheritances and skill
differences, the presence of annuities increases the Gini coefficient to 0.550 (Table 7, row
4) from 0.355 (Table 3, row 4).  Wealth inequality is increased because a sizable fraction
of low earning households now arrive at retirement with zero wealth whereas the richer
households--for whom the annuity is very small relative to consumption per capita--
accumulate roughly the same amount of wealth they would have accumulated in the
absence of social security.  Consumption inequality is also slightly higher in most cases28
because the regressive payroll tax reduces the lifetime resources of those earning less than
the taxable limit by a greater proportion than those earning above this limit.
Like the results of Table 3, Table 7's results also indicate that marital sorting by
skill levels increases inequality (compare rows 4 and 6), but inheritance of skills from
parents does not (compare rows 4 and 8).  When all of the factors are present, the Gini
coefficient is 0.63, much closer to the 0.727 value for the SCF wealth distribution.  As
row 10 of Table 8 indicates, so too is the upper tail of the wealth distribution.
It is worth noting that the introduction of an unfair annuity changes qualitatively
the impact of inheritances on intragenerational wealth inequality. Unlike Tables 3 and 5,
each pair of rows in Table 7 indicates that inheritances increase wealth inequality. For
example, the Gini coefficient on wealth increases from 0.567 without inheritances (row 9)
to 0.627 with inheritances (row 10).  This occurs despite the relatively small flow of
intergenerational transfers—1.2 percent of labor earnings. The explanation for this is that
the availability of annuities renders the distribution of bequeathable wealth considerably
more unequal and perpetuates wealth inequality across extended families.  High earning
parents who accumulate positive wealth through retirement may bequeath a lot if they die
early.  The receipt of inheritances by their children causes the retirement borrowing
constraint to be non-binding for them and induce a positive wealth balance at retirement.
Hence, they may, in turn, bequeath substantial wealth to their children and so on.
This sequence of bequests and accumulation by households for whom the
borrowing constraint at retirement is non-binding stands in sharp contrast to that of
households for whom it is binding.  The latter households do not bequeath any wealth to
their children most of whom may, therefore, be subject to the borrowing constraint29
themselves.  The annuitization of lifetime resources makes wealth inequality and its
persistence across bequeathing and non-bequeathing households so large that the
inheritance process reinforces rather than reduces wealth inequality at retirement. The
Gini coefficient increases from 0.460 when no annuities are available (Table 3, row 10) to
0.627 when they are available (Table 7, row 10).
Adding Social Security and Progressive Income Taxation
Tables 9 and 10 introduce both social security and progressive income taxation.
In each of the cases with inheritances and skill differences the wealth Gini is significantly
higher with annuitization and progressive income taxation (Table 9) relative to the cases
where both of these factors are absent (Table 3).  For example, when both marital sorting
by skills and inheritance of skills are present (rows 10 in the two tables), the Gini
increases to 0.64 when annuitization and progressive income taxation are present (Table
9) from 0.46 when they are absent (Table 3).
The wealth unequalizing impact of inheritances when social security is in effect is
magnified in the presence of progressive income taxation.  Rows 9 and 10 of Table 9
show that introducing inheritances increases the Gini coefficient from 0.52 to 0.64 -- a
quite important difference.  It is also a larger difference than that between the
corresponding cases of Table 7.  Without inheritances, progressive income taxation
reduces wealth inequality even when annuitization is present (compare rows 9 in Tables 7
and 9).  This occurs because income taxes are more than proportionally higher for those
with higher incomes leading to lower lifecycle accumulation by higher earning
households.  However, the resulting distribution of wealth is still considerably more30
unequal (and the inequality is more persistent across bequeathing and non-bequeathing
households) compared to the case of progressive income taxation without annuitization
(compare rows 9 in Tables 5 and 9).
Comparing Gini values in rows 9 and 10 in Table 9 shows that inheritances
increase wealth inequality substantially when both annuitization and progressive income
taxation are present.  Indeed, the presence of progressive income taxation increases the
number of households that may be subject to the borrowing constraint at retirement.  This
accounts for the higher Gini value of 0.643 when annuitization and progressive income
taxation are both present (Table 9, row 10), relative to when only annuitization is present
-- 0.627 (Table 7, row 10).  Hence, progressive income taxation may intensify the wealth
unequalizing impact of inheritances when annuities are available.
Finally, Table 10 shows the wealth distributions obtained for the cases reported in
Table 9.  The final simulation (row 10) shows that the top 1, 5, and 10 percent of 66-year-
old households hold 27.4, 53.7, and 60.5 percent of aggregate wealth respectively.  As
shown in Figure 2, these wealth shares closely approximate those observed in the SCF
1995 wealth distribution for married households aged 60-69 -- namely, 30.4, 51.0 and
62.5 percent respectively.
V. Conclusion
Many people intuitively believe that inheritances, because of their random nature
and receipt by the lucky few, contribute significantly to inequality in wealth holdings
among members of the same cohort.  As economic theory suggests and as this paper’s
simulations confirm, this is not necessarily the case: Indeed, because the process31
underlying inheritances is, in large part, unrelated to the earnings differences that are the
key determinant of life cycle wealth accumulation, inheritances can be a wealth-
equalizing.  This result goes the other way, however, when annuities are available.
This paper develops a large-scale life-cycle simulation model with uncertain
longevity, skill differences, assortative mating, inherited skills, annuitization via a social
security system, and progressive income taxation.  We find that skill differences, the
annuitization of retirement savings, and assortative mating are the major factors
underlying intragenerational wealth inequality.  In addition, the inheritance of bequests is
an important contributor to wealth inequality, but only in the presence of social security.
In contrast, the inheritance of skills from one’s parents does not seem to matter
much for wealth inequality.  Progressive income taxation reduces wealth inequality by a
small but not insignificant amount when annuities are unavailable.  However, by making
a larger fraction of households borrowing-constrained at retirement, it can amplify the
wealth unequalizing impact of inheritances in the presence of annuities.
Taken together, the factors examined in this paper are capable of explaining
observed U.S. wealth inequality at retirement.  Including all of the factors in our
simulation produces a Gini coefficient of 0.643, which is 88 percent as large as the value
observed in the 1995 SCF. With a higher degree of annuitization, arising from, for
example, civil service and private defined benefit pensions, we could easily achieve a
Gini as large as that in the SCF.  As it is, the upper tail of our simulated wealth
distribution matches quite closely the upper tail in the SCF distribution.  Hence, our
model can explain both the overall inequality as well as the skewness in the actual U.S.
wealth distribution.32
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Table 1.1    Distribution of Females by Number and Sex of Births At Ages 22 Through 43
*
CORESIM DATA
Female Births Æ     0       1       2       3       4       5
                 __________________________________________________
Male Births  ¯
             0    20.68   12.94    6.96    1.49     .33     .10
             1    13.64   14.77    5.32    1.38     .35     .13
             2     7.83    5.06    2.16     .70     .24     .12
             3     1.87    1.38     .64     .23     .12     .05
             4      .41     .33     .17     .12     .08     .00
             5      .12     .13     .11     .05     .00     .00
____________________________________________________________________
* Females with at least one but less than 5 births numbered 40434.
Source: Authors' calculations based on CORSIM Birth Matrix.
Table 1.2   Distribution of Females by Number and Sex of Births At Ages 22 Through 43
BIRTH MATRIX USED IN SIMULATION
Female Births -->     0       1       2       3       4       5
__________________________________________________
Male Births  ¯
             0      .00   13.00    9.00    2.20     .55     .15
             1    16.05   22.40    6.45    1.60     .50     .00
             2    12.20    7.15    2.50     .80     .00     .00
             3     2.85     .95     .75     .00     .00     .00
             4      .40     .40     .00     .00     .00     .00




SCF Wealth Distribution of Married Households with Household Heads Aged 60-69
                          Percent of Wealth Held By Top*                                                       Gini
                                                                                                                                                                                                Coefficient
 99%    95%    90%    75%    50%    25%    10%     5%     1%
         _______________________________________________________________
SCF    100.00 100.00  99.90  98.70  92.90  79.80  62.50  51.00  30.40     0.727
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
* Weighted by the SCF’s non-response adjusted “final weight.”
Source: Authors’ calculations from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 1995.38
Table 3   Inequality and Bequest Flows-without Social Security and without Progressive Income Taxation
(Age 66, 2000 Households, 150 Years, r=4%)
                                        Wealth   Consumption     Total      X-Gen    Consumption
                                         Gini        Gini        Bequest    Bequest     Flow*
                                                                 Flow*      Flow*
 1. No mortality                        0.045       0.045         0.00       0.00      74.55
 2. Mortality                           0.075       0.075         9.00       2.90      76.60
 3. No Mortality and Skill Differences  0.365       0.365         0.00       0.00      74.55
 4. Mortality and Skill Differences     0.355       0.355         9.29       2.94      76.57
 5. No Mortality, Skill Differences,
    and Marital Sorting                 0.455       0.455         0.00       0.00      74.55
 6. Mortality, Marital Sorting,
    and, Skill Differences              0.432       0.432         8.32       2.47      76.53
 7. No Mortality, Skill Differences,
    and Inherited Skills                0.368       0.368         0.00       0.00      74.54
 8. Mortality, Skill Differences,
    and Inherited Skills                0.366       0.366         9.10       3.10      76.65
 9. No Mortality, Skill Differences,
    Marital Sorting, and
    Inherited Skills                    0.466       0.466         0.00       0.00      74.53
10. Mortality, Skill Differences,
    Marital Sorting, and
    Inherited Skills                    0.460       0.460         8.84       2.79      76.59
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
* Annual flow as a percent of annual labor income. X-Gen stands for cross-generation.39
Table 4   Wealth Distribution—without Social Security and without Progressive Income Taxation
(Age 66, 2000 Households, 150 Years, r=4%)
Percent of Wealth Held By Top
                                             99%    95%    90%    75%    50%    25%    10%     5%     1%
                                            _____________________________________________________________
 1. No mortality                            99.21  95.87  91.49  77.68  53.22  27.34  11.09   5.58   1.12
 2. Mortality                               99.26  96.10  91.94  78.68  55.09  29.72  13.08   7.00   1.62
 3. No Mortality and Skill Differences      99.88  98.89  97.16  90.06  73.31  50.05  31.05  22.33   6.62
 4. Mortality and Skill Differences         99.86  98.78  96.97  89.62  72.70  49.46  30.39  21.63   6.28
 5. No Mortality, Skill Differences,
    and Marital Sorting                     99.98  99.64  98.73  93.70  79.06  56.20  35.88  26.43  11.25
 6. Mortality, Marital Sorting,
    and, Skill Differences                  99.97  99.52  98.49  92.90  77.68  54.60  34.42  24.97  10.57
 7. No Mortality, Skill Differences,
    and Inherited Skills                    99.89  98.95  97.24  90.10  73.42  50.38  31.48  22.80   7.01
 8. Mortality, Skill Differences,
    and Inherited Skills                    99.87  98.88  97.14  89.99  73.26  50.26  31.30  22.71   6.68
 9. No Mortality, Skill Differences,
    Marital Sorting, and
    Inherited Skills                        99.97  99.63  98.69  93.70  79.55  57.27  37.47  28.18  11.34
10. Mortality, Skill Differences,
    Marital Sorting, and
    Inherited Skills                        99.97  99.62  98.70  93.76  79.29  56.71  36.61  27.10  11.77
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source: Authors’ calculations.40
 Table 5   Inequality and Bequest Flows-without Social Security and with Progressive Income Taxation
(Wealth at Age 66, 2000 Households, 150 Years, r=4%)
                                        Wealth   Consumption    Total      X-Gen    Consumption
                                         Gini       Gini        Bequest    Bequest     Flow*
                                                                Flow*      Flow*
 1. No mortality                        0.039       0.038         0.00       0.00      61.47
 2. Mortality                           0.067       0.065         7.35       2.26      62.92
 3. No Mortality and Skill Differences  0.325       0.315         0.00       0.00      59.43
 4. Mortality and Skill Differences     0.314       0.304         7.31       2.55      60.86
 5. No Mortality, Skill Differences,
    and Marital Sorting                 0.409       0.398         0.00       0.00      58.41
 6. Mortality, Marital Sorting,
    and, Skill Differences              0.393       0.381         7.27       2.12      59.81
 7. No Mortality, Skill Differences,
    and Inherited Skills                0.323       0.313         0.00       0.00      59.23
 8. Mortality, Skill Differences,
    and Inherited Skills                0.319       0.309         7.00       2.39      60.88
 9. No Mortality, Skill Differences,
    Marital Sorting, and
    Inherited Skills                    0.423       0.412         0.00       0.00      58.53
10. Mortality, Skill Differences,
    Marital Sorting, and
    Inherited Skills                    0.420       0.409         6.90       2.27      59.62
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
*Annual flow as a percent of annual labor income. X-Gen stands for cross-generation.41
Table 6: Wealth Distribution—without Social Security and with Progressive Income Taxation
(Wealth at Age 66, 2000 Households, 150 Years, r=4%)
Percent of Wealth Held By Top
                                             99%    95%    90%    75%    50%    25%    10%     5%     1%
                                            _____________________________________________________________
 1. No mortality                            99.19  95.78  91.34  77.43  52.83  27.04  10.92   5.48   1.10
 2. Mortality                               99.24  95.99  91.74  78.32  54.58  29.28  12.76   6.75   1.50
 3. No Mortality and Skill Differences      99.87  98.71  96.75  88.97  70.86  46.99  27.86  19.55   5.55
 4. Mortality and Skill Differences         99.86  98.69  96.68  88.61  70.40  46.02  26.89  18.72   5.33
 5. No Mortality, Skill Differences,
    and Marital Sorting                     99.97  99.55  98.43  92.66  76.54  52.40  31.98  22.82   9.39
 6. Mortality, Marital Sorting,
    and, Skill Differences                  99.96  99.44  98.18  92.03  75.45  51.25  30.95  21.93   9.09
 7. No Mortality, Skill Differences,
    and Inherited Skills                    99.87  98.81  96.91  89.12  70.81  46.52  27.69  19.28   5.63
 8. Mortality, Skill Differences,
    and Inherited Skills                    99.84  98.66  96.65  88.60  70.56  46.67  27.48  19.19   5.67
 9. No Mortality, Skill Differences,
    Marital Sorting, and
    Inherited Skills                        99.97  99.59  98.51  92.93  77.30  53.52  33.35  24.30   9.42
10. Mortality, Skill Differences,
    Marital Sorting, and
    Inherited Skills                        99.96  99.52  98.39  92.77  77.09  53.46  33.28  24.03   9.37
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source: Authors’ calculations.42
Table 7: Inequality and Bequest Flows--with Social Security and without Progressive Income Taxation
(Wealth at Age 66, 2000 Households, 150 Years, r=4%, 30% of Payroll Taxes Annuitized)
                                        Wealth   Consumption    Total      X-Gen    Consumption
                                         Gini       Gini        Bequest    Bequest     Flow*
                                                                Flow*      Flow*
 1. No mortality                        0.099       0.045         0.00       0.00      66.57
 2. Mortality                           0.146       0.049         2.64       0.88      68.02
 3. No Mortality and Skill Differences  0.505       0.382         0.00       0.00      68.09
 4. Mortality and Skill Differences     0.550       0.373         3.72       1.33      69.72
 5. No Mortality, Skill Differences,
    and Marital Sorting                 0.575       0.467         0.00       0.00      68.07
 6. Mortality, Marital Sorting,
    and, Skill Differences              0.614       0.456         3.33       1.01      69.61
 7. No Mortality, Skill Differences,
    and Inherited Skills                0.496       0.378         0.00       0.00      68.10
 8. Mortality, Skill Differences,
    and Inherited Skills                0.517       0.351         3.88       1.35      69.66
 9. No Mortality, Skill Differences,
    Marital Sorting, and
    Inherited Skills                    0.567       0.462         0.00       0.00      68.10
10. Mortality, Skill Differences,
    Marital Sorting, and
    Inherited Skills                    0.627       0.464         3.72       1.20      69.70
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
* Annual flow as a percent of annual labor income. X-Gen stands for cross-generation.43
Table 8: Wealth Distribution—with Social Security and without Progressive Income Taxation
(Wealth at Age 66, 2000 Households, 150 Years, r=4%, 30% of Payroll Taxes Annuitized)
Percent of Wealth Held By Top
                                             99%    95%    90%    75%    50%    25%    10%     5%     1%
                                            ______________________________________________________________
 1. No mortality                            99.47  96.93  93.32  80.97  57.18  30.22  12.42   6.28   1.28
 2. Mortality                               99.65  97.71  94.65  83.35  60.47  32.85  14.37   7.67   1.75
 3. No Mortality and Skill Differences      99.92  99.21  97.96  92.64  80.10  61.98  45.73  36.76  12.50
 4. Mortality and Skill Differences         99.93  99.35  98.31  93.77  82.42  65.87  50.07  40.62  13.17
 5. No Mortality, Skill Differences,
    and Marital Sorting                     99.98  99.72  99.03  95.20  84.08  66.58  50.32  41.72  20.88
 6. Mortality, Marital Sorting,
    and, Skill Differences                  99.98  99.70  99.06  95.66  85.85  70.13  54.86  46.18  22.55
 7. No Mortality, Skill Differences,
    and Inherited Skills                    99.93  99.25  97.99  92.63  79.62  61.19  44.74  35.90  11.31
 8. Mortality, Skill Differences,
    and Inherited Skills                    99.94  99.30  98.10  93.08  80.74  62.72  46.47  37.80  15.28
 9. No Mortality, Skill Differences,
    Marital Sorting, and
    Inherited Skills                        99.98  99.71  99.01  95.26  84.01  66.01  49.01  39.75  19.07
10. Mortality, Skill Differences,
    Marital Sorting, and
    Inherited Skills                        99.98  99.77  99.21  96.09  86.77  71.06  56.12  47.37  21.01
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source: Authors’ calculations.44
Table 9: Inequality and Bequest Flows--with Social Security and with Progressive Income Taxation
(Wealth at Age 66, 2000 Households, 150 Years, r=4%, 30% of Payroll Taxes Annuitized)
                                        Wealth   Consumption    Total      X-Gen    Consumption
                                         Gini       Gini        Bequest    Bequest     Flow*
                                                                Flow*      Flow*
 1. No mortality                        0.114       0.038         0.00       0.00      54.99
 2. Mortality                           0.207       0.040         1.24       0.39      56.35
 3. No Mortality and Skill Differences  0.473       0.328         0.00       0.00      54.07
 4. Mortality and Skill Differences     0.575       0.323         2.30       0.67      55.44
 5. No Mortality, Skill Differences,
    and Marital Sorting                 0.532       0.407         0.00       0.00      53.08
 6. Mortality, Marital Sorting,
    and, Skill Differences              0.623       0.401         2.14       0.75      54.44
 7. No Mortality, Skill Differences,
    and Inherited Skills                0.463       0.320         0.00       0.00      54.12
 8. Mortality, Skill Differences,
    and Inherited Skills                0.570       0.316         2.01       0.57      55.55
 9. No Mortality, Skill Differences,
    Marital Sorting, and
    Inherited Skills                    0.516       0.402         0.00       0.00      53.01
10. Mortality, Skill Differences,
    Marital Sorting, and
    Inherited Skills                    0.643       0.415         2.01       0.61      54.31
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
* Annual flow as a percent of annual labor income. X-Gen stands for cross-generation.45
Table 10: Wealth Distribution—with Social Security and with Progressive Income Taxation
(Wealth at Age 66, 2000 Households, 150 Years, r=4%, 30% of Payroll Taxes Annuitized)
Percent of Wealth Held By Top
                                             99%    95%    90%    75%    50%    25%    10%     5%     1%
                                            ______________________________________________________________
 1. No mortality                            99.55  97.26  93.89  82.03  58.19  30.92  12.66   6.40   1.30
 2. Mortality                               99.96  99.02  96.83  87.36  65.00  35.82  15.51   8.26   1.90
 3. No Mortality and Skill Differences      99.85  98.89  97.33  91.31  77.63  59.61  45.19  36.85  11.44
 4. Mortality and Skill Differences         99.97  99.41  98.30  93.78  83.00  67.95  54.45  45.29  14.73
 5. No Mortality, Skill Differences,
    and Marital Sorting                     99.97  99.56  98.54  93.63  80.94  63.13  48.73  41.25  20.72
 6. Mortality, Marital Sorting,
    and, Skill Differences                  99.99  99.68  98.89  95.13  85.31  70.86  58.40  50.77  25.82
 7. No Mortality, Skill Differences,
    and Inherited Skills                    99.87  98.84  97.21  91.02  77.21  58.78  43.93  35.62  12.15
 8. Mortality, Skill Differences,
    and Inherited Skills                    99.96  99.39  98.31  93.73  82.66  67.32  54.31  45.44  14.55
 9. No Mortality, Skill Differences,
    Marital Sorting, and
    Inherited Skills                        99.97  99.57  98.52  93.51  80.40  61.55  46.49  39.12  19.91
10. Mortality, Skill Differences,
    Marital Sorting, and
    Inherited Skills                        99.99  99.73  99.05  95.52  86.20  72.30  60.54  53.78  27.37
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source: Authors’ calculations.46
* Normalized to yield annual wage flow of $176000 in the simulation (see text).
Source: Authors’ calculations from the Current Population Survey, March 1996.




























Figure 2: Percent of Wealth Held by Household Above Selected Percentile: SCF* vs. Final Simulation























































* Married households with household heads aged 60-69.
Source: Authors’ calculations from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 1995 and simulation (Table 10, row 10).